Globalization

Strategic Trade Policy, What’s Next?

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By Sheldon Birkett

OPINION EDITORIAL

THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE “WIN-SET”

As Canadian official tread lightly in latest round of NAFTA negotiations the United States is strategically “gaming” the odds in their favour. Developed from game theory, which each “state-actor” (or player) makes their optimal decision contingent other players actions, strategic trade policy applies trade barriers (technical and non-technical barriers) to optimize a state’s domestic and international political position. More classically described as “win-sets,” developed by political scientist Robert Putnam, determines the degree of policy options available within international negotiations given the domestic political constraints present.[i] A state, with a more complacent domestic population, entails that international negotiators would be able to consider more varied policy options when active in trade negotiations. Having more varied policy options occurs because political figures, under conditions of a complacent population, have less political capital to lose if negotiations turn sour. Meaning a larger variance in public opinion emerges because of a multiplicity of complacent attitudes. Therefore, the larger variance of public opinion, or lack thereof, would not hold political representatives to account if they get a maleficent deal. This is simply because domestic public opinion is not polarized to the extent that political representatives must appeal to certain sectors of the population to remain in power. On the other hand, a narrow “win-set” would mean that political representatives would have a scarcity of policy options to choose from in international negotiations.[ii] This is simply due to the fact that a less complacent, more polarized, domestic population would place strict (more directed) demands on political representatives to appeal to their agenda. Therefore, underlying a trade negotiator’s role is the hawk of public opinion constraining the optimum trade policy option.

One might say, how is the notion of a “win-set” considered in reality when many factors are at play in modern trade negotiations. For example, if international negotiators more closely considered the elasticity of political demands of their constituents they would be better able to fine-tune the key points in negotiations. However, the example described above is an ideal “textbook” case when it comes to the breath of multinational trade negotiations at play. If you wanted a deeper understanding of why trade negotiations succeed, or fail in dismay, one needs to consider economic interdependence between countries. In other words, by calculating the marginal rate of substitution between two goods it is possible to estimate the likelihood of the good being imported (through trade) given its domestic cost in autarky. Needless to say, by calculating the first derivative at a given quantity for a particular good it is possible to estimate the value of a good relative to another good (assuming that changes in the market for the factors of production and socio-cultural preferences are accounted for). This same idea can be applied to a “good” such as a political demand making it possible to calculate the marginal rate of substitution between policy options, although a government’s policy is an intangible good. Therefore, by aggregating all possible policy options’ elasticities it would be possible to calculate the optimum trade policy option. As an idea it sounds good on paper, but we do not have the computational power necessary to calculate such an aggregate result. Even if we did have such a computer, the optimum policy at that given point does not take into consideration political-economic changes in the environment. The result calculated would not be dynamic over time. As shown in statistics, the more variables you consider in a model calculating an “optimum trade policy” the more factors you have to consider as the inaccuracy of the model grows exponentially. Therefore, the notion of a “win-set” proves useful in simplifying the factors to consider in free trade negotiations albeit it is an abstraction from reality. Thus, by examining dynamic cases it is possible to further understand the relative weights on the factors considered by lead negotiators.

THE AUGMENTED TRILEMMA

Before delving into specific cases of trade negotiations it is pivotal to situate the global trajectory of international economic integration. I believe the best way to conceptualize the trajectory of international trade since WWII is to situate it within Dani Rodrik’s augmented political trilemma.[iii] Note that I am not saying Rodrik’s framework is an exact science, but far from it, I am just using the augmented political trilemma to illustrate how international trade policy has developed. Similar to the macroeconomic “impossible trinity principle”[iv] the augmented political trilemma states that a country can only maintain two of the three characteristics between strong international economic integration, a sovereign nation-state, and mass politics.[v]

In the augmented political trilemma, a country has three broad economic policies to choose from. Firstly, the golden straight-jacket maintains a country’s national sovereignty while pursuing international economic integration. Under the golden straight-jacket a government will practice small government economic policies, which advocate flexible labour legislation, privatization, and deregulation of capital markets. For example, most developing countries fall into the golden straight-jacket trap because of their need to compete for foreign investment from larger “more robust” economies.[vi] In contrast to the golden straight-jacket is global federalism (or supranationalism). Global federalism combines integrated international economies and mass politics at the expense of national sovereignty. Unlike the golden straight-jacket, which sacrifices mass politics, global federalism embraces mass politics (e.g. European Union).[vii] Lastly, the Bretton Woods compromise combines national sovereignty and mass politics as its broad economic policy.[viii] The Bretton Woods compromise is reminiscent of the post-WWII international economic order when national economies were skeptical of complete economic integration and ad-valorem tariffs were permissible under GATT rules.

According to Rodrik, global federalism is the inevitable end-goal in the long-run (over 100 years). However, given the short-term climate of rising protectionism Rodrik predicts the golden straight-jacket to be the predominate broad international economic policy of the early twenty-first century.[ix] Therefore, if Rodrik’s predictions are true about the future of international economic integration it would imply that the short-term future of international trade would follow a more protectionist (or cautionary) approach then at the start of the 2000’s. As a result, the urgency to understand strategic trade policy in an age of protectionism is more relevant now then ever before.

THE CASE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)

The struggles of renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) shows that the golden straight-jacket policy is the predominate trade strategy in the twenty-first century. The United States demands to reject the current dispute-settlement (Chapter 19) procedure, in favour of domestic dispute resolution, and its insistence to increase patent protections on Canadian pharmaceuticals challenges Canada’s “fireproof house” mentality. Considering NAFTA has been under an intense thirteen-month renegotiation period, with minimal success on the most pressing issues (i.e. dispute settlement, supply management etc.), it is fair to say that a complete United States-Mexico-Canada deal seems unlikely by then end of 2018. It is much more probable that the United States-Mexico deal will come into affect by early 2019, given that the outgoing Mexican administration under President Nieto (and the Trump administration) would like to sign a deal as a political statement. Meanwhile, the Canadian negotiators, under Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland, have little leverage over the United States Trade Representative Robert Lightizer when it comes to the final negotiation issues. Under pressure from the American administration Mexico would likely sign a deal without Canada, given that the September 30th deadline is fast approaching.[x] However, with the United States and Canada in a political gridlock it is unlikely a tri-national deal would be agreed upon anytime soon. The reason for the United States reluctance to agree upon a deal is because the policy trade-off is simply too high. In other words, the marginal rate of substitution of American demands is simply too high of a cost when contrasted against Canadian preferences.

Even in a world burgeoning with political juxtapositions between nationalism and globalism the economic calculus does not lie. No matter how extravagant the Trump administration, or any other political party, would like to bring back the day when “America was great” it simply isn’t going to happen. Even if Trump would willingly accept the fact that the manufacturing jobs of the 1960’s will not come back, but still aim for a national policy targeting full-employment, free-market economists would surely object to such a policy at the expense of inflation. One only has to look at the 1973 OPEC crisis which was followed by a period of severe stagflation (inflation and lower output) to understand the costs of inflation.[xi] In a world where neoclassical economics has prevailed, and free-market ideology has been widely accepted amongst the world’s top economists, it is likely that protectionism will not last long. The question is not if protectionism will prevail, but when will protectionism fail?

Lastly, trade is not a matter of political concessions for exchange of market access, rather, free trade is a matter of national welfare. Revisiting the fundamentals of the Ricardian model of international trade any student of economics will be familiar with the phrase that “free trade is beneficial if the gains from the winners exceed the loss of the losers and the losers are compensated for their losses”.[xii] Applying this redistributive principle to the NAFTA negotiations it is apparent that strategic trade policy is politically motivated, while the fundamentals of international trade are motivated by economics. I’d like to think that the economic calculus will always prevail against politically motivated policies, but only time will tell under auspicious protectionism.

 

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Citations

[i] Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, 42, (1988): 427–460.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Dani Rodrik, “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, no. 1, (2000): 177-186, http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/readings/How%20Far%20Will%20International%20Economic%20Integration%20Go.pdf.

[iv] Macroeconomic phenomenon that an open-economy can only maintain two of the three macroeconomic characteristics between an independent monetary policy, fixed exchange rates, and an open capital account.

[v]  Dani Rodrik, “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, no. 1, (2000): 177-186, http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/readings/How%20Far%20Will%20International%20Economic%20Integration%20Go.pdf.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Alan Rappeport, “Trump Trade Negotiator Warns That Canada Is Running Out of Time,” The New York Times, September 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25/us/politics/trade-canada-lighthizer.html.

[xi] Michael Corbett, “Oil Shock of 1973-74,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil_shock_of_1973_74.

[xii] Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc Melitz, “International Economics: Theory and Policy Tenth Edition,” Pearson.

Liberalism and Globalization

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By Sheldon Birkett

In a world dominated by an ever-increasing bureaucratic structure it appears that economic globalization is not purely a symptom of political action, but increasingly, economic globalization is the cause of political action. If one is to criticize the basis of economic globalization (most commonly known as market neoliberalism) it is necessary to examine the substantive philosophical arguments which justify an neoliberal policy (or economic globalization). In essence, one must examine the central tendencies behind 18th century Liberalism as the prevailing doctrine of economic globalization. From, studying philosophical thinkers such as David Ricardo, Adam Smith, David Hume, and John Locke it is possible to foretell the unintended (or more likely intended) consequences of economic globalization. Therefore, by looking at the core beliefs behind economic globalization it is possible to derive the political decisions modern day leaders assert. As a preface to understanding the global political-economy approach to globalization it is necessary to take the long dure perspective of global history.

 

DEFINING GLOBALIZATION

But firstly, before delving into the intricacies of liberalism and globalization, it is necessary to understand basic definitions of globalization. So what is globalization? And to a larger sense how does economic globalization play into the role of 18th century liberalism? There is no definitive answer to what globalization is, as it is multifaceted concept. Most commonly, globalization can be defined as a trans-planetary process or set of processes involving increasing liquidity and growing multidirectional flows of people, objects, places and information as well as the structures they encounter and create that are barriers to, or expedite, those flows (Ritzer & Dean, 2014). This definition may seem very vague in nature and intellectually complex, as globalization can be viewed as either liberalization, universalization, westernization, internationalization as well as deteritorialization (Jan Art Sholte, 2005). Therefore, one does not simply understand the processes of globalization. Due to the complexity behind “globalization” it is much easier in academic literature to look at globalization as an economic phenomenon. Therefore, from this perspective globalization can be considered, within the neoliberal framework, as process of liberalization enacted through a reduction in trade barriers, privatization of industries & public services, deregulation of markets, and a de-compression of politics. As a caveat to note, one of the key defining features of contemporary economic globalization is Samuel Huntington’s notion that it is necessary to “decompress” politics (marketize politics) to eliminate barriers to the advancement of the neoliberal agenda. The decompression of political actors has most notably been witnessed in the developing world, as “puppet” regimes are replaced to serve “special interests” (most notably Chile in 1973), but the decompression of political actors begs to question to what extent are governments willing to reap the financial benefits from economic globalization at the cost of losing political support? Or, more importantly, how does a state survive (or develop) at the expense of foreign exploits? These are just a few questions economic globalization possess for nation-states in the 21st century. Although it would be too exhaustive to cover all the “possible” consequences (or problems) economic globalization possesses, but the ones mentioned above are worth considering when examining the origins of economic globalization.

 

ORGINS OF LIBERALISM & GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1971

Albeit the origins of economic globalization are highly debated among academics, some academics mark the times of Ibn Battuta, Marco Polo, and Genghis Khan as the pioneers of increased global interconnectedness. Other academics pursue that economic globalization is a relatively recent phenomenon that came into existence around the start of the 19th century as the “First Wave of Globalization”. Despite the debatable existence of globalization, it is crucial to examine the development of liberalism, since liberalism is the foundation of the dominate neoliberal ideology in market economics. In foreshadowing the question of “how” and “why” neoliberalism became the dominate ideology in market economics? It is necessary to see how the market-liberal tradition of the 19th century appealed to post-Keynesian policy makers. Principally, a turn away from Keynesian economics firstly entrusted increased economic growth which provided a solution to stagflation. Secondly, the return to liberalism in the 1970’s ensured the maintenance of Antonio Gramsci’s so-called “Historical Bloc” (i.e. the development of the “Punto Fijo” system in Venezuela). Thereby, contrasting the 19th century principals of market liberalism with the form of neoliberalism that took root in the 1970’s, it is possible to draw a more holistic picture of the rise of contemporary economic globalization, and its possible failure to provide an effective state apparatus.

The conversion of the U.S dollar from a fixed to floating exchange rate (removed from the gold standard) during the Nixon shocks of 1971 set in motion the collapse of the Bretton Woods economic framework, and ushering in the age of extreme liberal econometrics. Not only did the Nixon shocks help with the deregulation and financializing of international economics (effectively tackling inflation), but it also brought about a revolution in the mind, effectively changing the way individuals interact with the state. With the declining influence of the USSR as a major geopolitical polity in the 1980’s, there was no longer a need for the US economy to sustain a fully employed resilient domestic economy. Thus, the US effectively became a unipolar power, and as pointed out by Francis Fukuyama it was “the end of history”. Though, the decline of the USSR as a major contender to US power did not entail a utopian global-capitalist economy spreading the three pillars of democratic peace across the world. Instead, the revolution in American (albeit a larger extent western society) culture brought about a new radical liberal ontology, that cared little for the welfare state at the expense of free-market economics. As shown after 1989 the rate of productivity accelerated while the median family income stagnated Figure. 1 (Economic Policy Institute, 2014). The continued divergence between productivity and medium family income illustrates that Americans accepted the neoliberal ontology as a radical cultural transition took place behind the scenes. Changing the state apparatus of the U.S from a largely welfare state under FDR’s “New Deal”, to an individualized meritocratic neoliberal society under the “Washington Consensus”. Although this cultural transition may have gone unnoticed, structurally it was present with reforms in the Welfare State (i.e. Right to Work Legislation), convergence of commercial and private banking systems under the rejection of the Glass-Steagall Act, as well as growth in privatization along with a diminished role of the state. Internationally, during the post-war period there was an radical acceptance of Internationally Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs, which were effectively loans to developing nations experiencing a balance of payment crisis. Although the IMF knowingly administered the loans to developing nation-states which could never be able to fulfill the interest payments on such loans. Thus, many of these loans had to be wiped clean as odious debts in the 1990’s after years of experiencing economic dependency, yet problems of underdevelopment in many developing nation-states are still experienced.

(Figure.1)

productivity-median-dataset

Although liberalism and globalization may be enshrined as Robert Keohane’s “international liberalism”, Ulrich Beck’s “globality” or David Harvey’s “space-time compression” it is important to keep in mind the more sinister version of economic globalization, where political, social, and economic borders between individuals may be more prominent than ever before. Conceptually, the effects of globalization are neither beneficial or harmful (although I might be implying more of the negative effects of economic globalization), as there are two forms of globalization. One being globalization from below the other being globalization from above. Simply put globalization from below is what allows for discursive and political opportunity chances to occur (usually from the grassroots level i.e. 1994 Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN)). Globalization from above is a “top-down” systematic approach to globalization where greater interconnectedness is the result of agreements between bureaucratic international institutions (i.e. UN, IMF, WB, IFI’s…etc.). Thereby understanding that globalization is not only an unidirectional phenomenon, but intrinsically a multidirectional phenomenon, it is possible to understand economic globalization (or neo-liberalization) has both winners and losers.

 

BEYOND LIBERALISM; GLOBALIZATION

Perceiving globalization from the perspective of “winners” and “losers” it is possible to conceptualize globalization as a binary phenomenon, though contrasted with the asceticism of liberalism it begs to question if it is possible to view globalization as a progression of development? Rather than viewing globalization as having two definitive outcomes. The development theory of globalization can be found in the roots of classical liberalism. In John Locke’s First Treatise Chapter VII Locke makes a clear distinction between political power and personal property. In rebutting Robert Filmer’s theory of the divine right of kings Locke arises a crucial assumption between political power and property rights in Filmer’s argument, which is crucial to understanding the individual liberal ontology of personal ownership. Thus, the premise that God entitled Adam with the earth’s resources to will upon his eldest son, Filmer equivocally assumes that a transition of resources entails a transition of political power. On the other hand, Locke states that a transition of resources (or property) does not entail a transition of political power because the inheritor of resources did not inherit his “brethren” (or personal being) (Moseley). Therefore, an inheritor of property (or resources) cannot yield the same political power over others because they are fundamentally different individuals. In Locke’s Second Treatise Chapter V the argument of property ownership is taken further. Locke not only asserts that property ownership is transferable, but Locke also states that whatever a man mixed his own labour with becomes his property (Moseley). Therefore, Lockes conception of property increases the “net yield” or the “commonwealth” of a group, as individuals can utilize their labour for private ownership. The basic premise of property ownership under liberalism shows that increased private ownership, can be utilized for personal investments, trade or collateral in the aim of achieving development. From the liberalist perspective, it is possible to conceptualize increased globalization as beneficial for the individual because such actions of private ownership increase the net wealth of the group of individuals. All in all, on the surface (for liberals) globalization can be viewed as an increased stage of economic development beyond the traditional theories of classical liberalism.

 

IS GLOBALISM THE AMERICAN CENTURY?

Beyond the traditional assertions of classical liberalism, and modern day liberal internationalists, this central question still arises: Why is it that if liberalism was to bring about an increased wealth for all, how come there is still disparities globally? The fact of the matter is that there has been a rapid increase in net wealth and productivity during the 20th century, the only catch is that the positive effects of globalization have not been distributed evenly within and between nation-states. As Richard Florida asserted that the effects of globalization is a “spiky world”, where “…the talent-attracting “have” regions seem increasingly remote from the talent exporting “have-not” regions.” (Florida, 2005). The fact that there is an uneven distribution of resources globally implies that the underlying structures of wealth and power are present, as one nation-state must have more than the other nation-states. In an age of increasing global inequality (with the United States of America as the dominate unipolar hegemony) it is informative to ask if the age of globalism is the American century? If so, did liberalism win?

In 1941 Henry Luce proclaimed that the 20th century would be the “American Century”, although much can be said about the United States being the “global empire”, the dominance of the U.S does not adequately justify a “win” for liberalism or globalization. The United States global hegemony does not justify the premise that globalization (liberalization) is overall beneficial, because as a global society we are very much in the crux of globalization. Any attempt to state that globalism is Americanism is false. As globalization is not merely an extension of promoting democratic peace, republican representation, free markets, and liberal human rights, but globalization is also the antithesis to a world of greater interconnections. Instrumentally, globalization is much more than the dominance of the U.S cultural values and ideologies, as there are continual tensions between the “winners” and “losers” of globalization which expand across national identities not confined to any single ideology (i.e. wealth inequality). Intrinsically globalization of the 21st century looks more like Marx’s dialectic than Rostow’s modernization theory beyond high mass consumption.

 

WHAT’S NEXT? POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY

In an era of globalization, the only thing that is certain is uncertainty itself. Twenty sixteen illustrates that uncertainty is the only thing which is certain, from the impeachment of Lula, Brexit, election of Donald Trump, rise in populist politics, Cold War like diplomatic relations between nations, continued turmoil in the middle east (i.e. Yemen & Syria) and the increased migrant crisis all goes to show that the effects of globalization are inevitable.

Keeping in mind that any possible future outcomes of globalization (good or bad) are inevitable, it is too easy for anyone to view the world from an pessimistic perspective while the positive factors are easily overlooked. Therefore, it is crucial to cautiously remind oneself of the progressive development in democratic agency because of the driving process’s behind globalization, such as advancements in technology, science, engineering and mathematics (also to note advancements of political agency in social equality). Examining globalization from the historical long duré perspective it is not only possible to see how certain variables produce unsuspected outcomes, as well it is possible to see how even fundamental ideas such as property, freedom and security continually re-produce global civil society. Globalization should not be viewed as a binary phenomenon, instead globalization is multifaceted in nature.

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Citations

Economic Policy Institute. (2014). Productivity and real median family income growth, 1948-2013. Retrieved from, http://stateofworkingamerica.org/charts/productivity-and-real-median-family-income-growth-1947-2009/

Florida, Richard. (2005, October). The World Is Spiky: Globalization has changed the economic playing field, but hasn’t leveled it. The Atlantic, 48-51.

Moseley, Alexander. John Locke: Political Philosophy. Two Treatises of Government. Retrieved from, http://www.iep.utm.edu/locke-po/#SH5a

Ritzer, George., & Dean, Paul. (2015). Globalization: A Basic Text. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing & John Wiley & Sons.

Scholte, Jan Aart. (2005). Globalization: A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke, New Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Return of Neo-nationalism?

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By Sheldon Birkett

The perceived return of 20th century nationalism, and the subsequent rise of populist rhetoric is deepening the fragmented flaws present in “western liberal democracy”. The United States as a unipolar imperial power, with a rise in populist politics, begs to question if a liberal democratic form of governance is the best form of governance in the 21st century. Although the subsequent rise of neo-populist leaders in America, East Asia, and Europe are deeply rooted in the macroeconomic failures of the capitalist world system, it is of the upmost importance to consider if regime change in the west is necessary as there is a heightened sense of political uncertainty. Specifically, are the alternatives to liberal-democratic regimes less susceptible to populist politics? If so, how should these alternative regimes govern in a globalized world? I do not intend to provide any definite “answers” to the questions of regime change. Instead, I wish to reconsider the normative perception of liberal-democratic regimes in an age of populist politics.

Firstly, if one is to reconsider regime change in the 21st century it is necessary to seek alternatives to liberal-democracy, because no form of governance is a form of governance. Traditionally democratic governance is seen as the best form of governance as it provides a wide variety of civil liberties, human rights, and universal suffrage. This conception of democracy is usually equated to Robert Dahl’s narrow definition of “procedural democracy” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Dahl’s definition of democracy is narrow as it does not allow for an adequate variation in how democracy is enacted (i.e. by means of direct action movements). Instead, Joseph Schumpeter’s conceptualization of democracy as democratic electoralism is too broad in nature as a democracy is merely more than an election every four to five years, as democratic practices should be continuous in nature (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Therefore, finding an adequate balance between a rechstaat (rule-state) democratic order and an open-participatory democratic order is a difficult balance to achieve in an age of rising global inequality which is threatening the democratic framework.

In the aim to provide alternatives to our current democratic regime, it is necessary to see if alternatives to liberal democracy have succeeded in the past. When examining regimes such as Fujimori, Chavez, and Cardenas it becomes apparent that their form of democratic governance is not wholeheartedly a western “liberal-democracy”. Instead, such regimes present a form of delegative democracy, in which political leaders win elections by means of appealing to an disenfranchised populous, once in power such regimes limit state rights in order to maintain political power (O’Donnell, 1996). For example, following the re-election of Venezuelan Hugo Chavez in 2006 Chavez held a referendum on the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution that would extend the presidential term from six to seven years, and allow for indefinite re-election (no two term limit). Chavez referendum failed to pass in 2007 as the political opposition viewed it as a grab for political power (Hellinger, 2009).

Though a more accurate depiction highlighting the instability of a delegative democracy sustaining western civil rights and liberties is the declaration of Martial Law by Filipino Ferdinand Marco’s in 1972. Principally, the enactment of Martial Law by Ferdinand Marco’s was to guarantee Marco’s political hegemony in the Philippines. Marco’s enactment of Martial Law was justified against the resurgence of the communist Huk rebellion in Central Luzon, which was virtually non-existent by the 1970’s. Instead, Marco’s attainment of political hegemony by means of delegative democracy was principally to extend Marco’s rule by parliamentary means of consistent re-election without a constitutional limit on the presidency (Celoza, 1997). As shown, delegative democracy as an alternative to “western liberal democracy” does not provide adequate civil rights and liberties to citizens. Therefore, it begs to question if there are valid alternatives to liberal democratic regimes, that are both politically stable in an age of globalism and not susceptible to populist political rhetoric? What about authoritarianism?

The most prominent “democratic” authoritarian regime in the western world is Vladimir Putin’s Russia, albeit with an approval rating over 80% Putin is one of the most popular leaders ever to be elected (Esipova & Ray, 2014). Though, if you have a further examination of Putin’s regime it is very clear that most of Putin’s success is in comparison to Boris Yeltsin’s political-economic failure as a leader of Russia, during and after Russia’s transformation from communism. Now, with rising tension between the U.S and Russia (i.e. 2016 Election Cyberattack on the U.S, and expulsion of Russian diplomats), and the 2014 annexation of Crimea, it is becoming apparent that Russia could be falling into another power seeking Thucydides trap. Showing that even democratic-authoritarian regimes are susceptible to political instability.

Delegative democracies, authoritarian democracies, and liberal democracies all appear to be inadequate in dealing with the growing complexity of globalism. The growth of populist parties across western liberal democracies in Greece, Spain, Italy, France, Hungary, Germany, United States, and Britain (just to name a few) is threatening the fundamental nature of democratic institutions. In an age of globalization, it is necessary to critically think of regime change as a possible aid to the resurgence of populist politics, neo-nationalism, and political uncertainty. Fundamentally, there is a need for a reconceptualization of democracy in an age of globalism, as 2016 goes to show that 2017 is looking more politically uncertain than ever before.

Click Here for a PDF Copy of The Return of Neo-Nationalism?

Citations

Celoza, Albert. (1997). Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Esipova., Neli, & Ray, Julie. (2014, July 18). Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/173597/russian-approval-putin-soars-highest-level-years.aspx

Hellinger, Daniel. (2009). “Chapter Seventeen: Venezuela” in Harry E. Vanden (Eds.), Politics of Latin America: The Power Game (Pages. 463-493). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Karl, Terry Lynn., & Schmitter, C. Philippe. (1991). What Democracy Is…and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3), 75-88.

O’ Donnell, Guillermo. (1996). “Chapter Seven: Delegative Democracy” in Larry Diamond (Eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Pages. 94-108). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.