Faculty of Public Affairs Research Month 2018: The Political-Economy of Trade Policy: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)


The United States’ decision to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represents a shift in the global governance of trade policy from mere tariff reduction towards “comprehensive,” or “ambitious,” free trade agreements (FTAs). This paper asks: What are the domestic and international factors that have resulted in the United States’ decision to renegotiate NAFTA? This paper argues that the U.S. decision to renegotiate NAFTA cannot be explained by a single mono-causal factor. Instead, a combination of domestic and international factors were key in the U.S. decision to renegotiate NAFTA. International factors include regime change, centralization of state power in international agreements, and a country’s relative terms of trade as a measure of a state’s competitive economic dominance. Domestic factors include a state’s internal institutional structure, income distribution, political cleavages, and voter perception. This paper identifies the potential factors that persuades a state to renegotiate FTAs.

Please see PDF of Poster and literature review in the link below 

The Political-Economy of Trade Policy: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Poster

The Political-Economy of Trade Policy: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Literature Review

Strategic Trade Policy, What’s Next?


By Sheldon Birkett



As Canadian official tread lightly in latest round of NAFTA negotiations the United States is strategically “gaming” the odds in their favour. Developed from game theory, which each “state-actor” (or player) makes their optimal decision contingent other players actions, strategic trade policy applies trade barriers (technical and non-technical barriers) to optimize a state’s domestic and international political position. More classically described as “win-sets,” developed by political scientist Robert Putnam, determines the degree of policy options available within international negotiations given the domestic political constraints present.[i] A state, with a more complacent domestic population, entails that international negotiators would be able to consider more varied policy options when active in trade negotiations. Having more varied policy options occurs because political figures, under conditions of a complacent population, have less political capital to lose if negotiations turn sour. Meaning a larger variance in public opinion emerges because of a multiplicity of complacent attitudes. Therefore, the larger variance of public opinion, or lack thereof, would not hold political representatives to account if they get a maleficent deal. This is simply because domestic public opinion is not polarized to the extent that political representatives must appeal to certain sectors of the population to remain in power. On the other hand, a narrow “win-set” would mean that political representatives would have a scarcity of policy options to choose from in international negotiations.[ii] This is simply due to the fact that a less complacent, more polarized, domestic population would place strict (more directed) demands on political representatives to appeal to their agenda. Therefore, underlying a trade negotiator’s role is the hawk of public opinion constraining the optimum trade policy option.

One might say, how is the notion of a “win-set” considered in reality when many factors are at play in modern trade negotiations. For example, if international negotiators more closely considered the elasticity of political demands of their constituents they would be better able to fine-tune the key points in negotiations. However, the example described above is an ideal “textbook” case when it comes to the breath of multinational trade negotiations at play. If you wanted a deeper understanding of why trade negotiations succeed, or fail in dismay, one needs to consider economic interdependence between countries. In other words, by calculating the marginal rate of substitution between two goods it is possible to estimate the likelihood of the good being imported (through trade) given its domestic cost in autarky. Needless to say, by calculating the first derivative at a given quantity for a particular good it is possible to estimate the value of a good relative to another good (assuming that changes in the market for the factors of production and socio-cultural preferences are accounted for). This same idea can be applied to a “good” such as a political demand making it possible to calculate the marginal rate of substitution between policy options, although a government’s policy is an intangible good. Therefore, by aggregating all possible policy options’ elasticities it would be possible to calculate the optimum trade policy option. As an idea it sounds good on paper, but we do not have the computational power necessary to calculate such an aggregate result. Even if we did have such a computer, the optimum policy at that given point does not take into consideration political-economic changes in the environment. The result calculated would not be dynamic over time. As shown in statistics, the more variables you consider in a model calculating an “optimum trade policy” the more factors you have to consider as the inaccuracy of the model grows exponentially. Therefore, the notion of a “win-set” proves useful in simplifying the factors to consider in free trade negotiations albeit it is an abstraction from reality. Thus, by examining dynamic cases it is possible to further understand the relative weights on the factors considered by lead negotiators.


Before delving into specific cases of trade negotiations it is pivotal to situate the global trajectory of international economic integration. I believe the best way to conceptualize the trajectory of international trade since WWII is to situate it within Dani Rodrik’s augmented political trilemma.[iii] Note that I am not saying Rodrik’s framework is an exact science, but far from it, I am just using the augmented political trilemma to illustrate how international trade policy has developed. Similar to the macroeconomic “impossible trinity principle”[iv] the augmented political trilemma states that a country can only maintain two of the three characteristics between strong international economic integration, a sovereign nation-state, and mass politics.[v]

In the augmented political trilemma, a country has three broad economic policies to choose from. Firstly, the golden straight-jacket maintains a country’s national sovereignty while pursuing international economic integration. Under the golden straight-jacket a government will practice small government economic policies, which advocate flexible labour legislation, privatization, and deregulation of capital markets. For example, most developing countries fall into the golden straight-jacket trap because of their need to compete for foreign investment from larger “more robust” economies.[vi] In contrast to the golden straight-jacket is global federalism (or supranationalism). Global federalism combines integrated international economies and mass politics at the expense of national sovereignty. Unlike the golden straight-jacket, which sacrifices mass politics, global federalism embraces mass politics (e.g. European Union).[vii] Lastly, the Bretton Woods compromise combines national sovereignty and mass politics as its broad economic policy.[viii] The Bretton Woods compromise is reminiscent of the post-WWII international economic order when national economies were skeptical of complete economic integration and ad-valorem tariffs were permissible under GATT rules.

According to Rodrik, global federalism is the inevitable end-goal in the long-run (over 100 years). However, given the short-term climate of rising protectionism Rodrik predicts the golden straight-jacket to be the predominate broad international economic policy of the early twenty-first century.[ix] Therefore, if Rodrik’s predictions are true about the future of international economic integration it would imply that the short-term future of international trade would follow a more protectionist (or cautionary) approach then at the start of the 2000’s. As a result, the urgency to understand strategic trade policy in an age of protectionism is more relevant now then ever before.


The struggles of renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) shows that the golden straight-jacket policy is the predominate trade strategy in the twenty-first century. The United States demands to reject the current dispute-settlement (Chapter 19) procedure, in favour of domestic dispute resolution, and its insistence to increase patent protections on Canadian pharmaceuticals challenges Canada’s “fireproof house” mentality. Considering NAFTA has been under an intense thirteen-month renegotiation period, with minimal success on the most pressing issues (i.e. dispute settlement, supply management etc.), it is fair to say that a complete United States-Mexico-Canada deal seems unlikely by then end of 2018. It is much more probable that the United States-Mexico deal will come into affect by early 2019, given that the outgoing Mexican administration under President Nieto (and the Trump administration) would like to sign a deal as a political statement. Meanwhile, the Canadian negotiators, under Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland, have little leverage over the United States Trade Representative Robert Lightizer when it comes to the final negotiation issues. Under pressure from the American administration Mexico would likely sign a deal without Canada, given that the September 30th deadline is fast approaching.[x] However, with the United States and Canada in a political gridlock it is unlikely a tri-national deal would be agreed upon anytime soon. The reason for the United States reluctance to agree upon a deal is because the policy trade-off is simply too high. In other words, the marginal rate of substitution of American demands is simply too high of a cost when contrasted against Canadian preferences.

Even in a world burgeoning with political juxtapositions between nationalism and globalism the economic calculus does not lie. No matter how extravagant the Trump administration, or any other political party, would like to bring back the day when “America was great” it simply isn’t going to happen. Even if Trump would willingly accept the fact that the manufacturing jobs of the 1960’s will not come back, but still aim for a national policy targeting full-employment, free-market economists would surely object to such a policy at the expense of inflation. One only has to look at the 1973 OPEC crisis which was followed by a period of severe stagflation (inflation and lower output) to understand the costs of inflation.[xi] In a world where neoclassical economics has prevailed, and free-market ideology has been widely accepted amongst the world’s top economists, it is likely that protectionism will not last long. The question is not if protectionism will prevail, but when will protectionism fail?

Lastly, trade is not a matter of political concessions for exchange of market access, rather, free trade is a matter of national welfare. Revisiting the fundamentals of the Ricardian model of international trade any student of economics will be familiar with the phrase that “free trade is beneficial if the gains from the winners exceed the loss of the losers and the losers are compensated for their losses”.[xii] Applying this redistributive principle to the NAFTA negotiations it is apparent that strategic trade policy is politically motivated, while the fundamentals of international trade are motivated by economics. I’d like to think that the economic calculus will always prevail against politically motivated policies, but only time will tell under auspicious protectionism.


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[i] Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, 42, (1988): 427–460.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Dani Rodrik, “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, no. 1, (2000): 177-186, http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/readings/How%20Far%20Will%20International%20Economic%20Integration%20Go.pdf.

[iv] Macroeconomic phenomenon that an open-economy can only maintain two of the three macroeconomic characteristics between an independent monetary policy, fixed exchange rates, and an open capital account.

[v]  Dani Rodrik, “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, no. 1, (2000): 177-186, http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/readings/How%20Far%20Will%20International%20Economic%20Integration%20Go.pdf.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Alan Rappeport, “Trump Trade Negotiator Warns That Canada Is Running Out of Time,” The New York Times, September 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25/us/politics/trade-canada-lighthizer.html.

[xi] Michael Corbett, “Oil Shock of 1973-74,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil_shock_of_1973_74.

[xii] Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc Melitz, “International Economics: Theory and Policy Tenth Edition,” Pearson.

Trade Politics, a Politics of Illusion

By Sheldon Birkett

On December 18, 2017, Canadian and British governments materialized in front of a U.S. trade tribunal arguing against Trump’s aggressive countervailing duties on Bombardier’s C-series jet. [i] The Canadian Ambassador to the United States, David MacNaughton, said the imposition of up to a 300 percent countervailing duty is illegitimate speculation premised on pure conjecture. [ii] This is one of the latest developments in the pro-protectionist populist backlash against the historic trend of global economic liberalization (circa. 1945).

The politics of trade protectionism must not be viewed in isolation from globalization, rather, protectionism is part of globalization. Irrespective of the variants of populism, which now pierces through the frontiers of domestic politics into global politics, globalization has perpetuated horizontal and vertical socio-economic global inequalities. Globalization in its entirety is a multifaceted and illusive concept, which is ambiguous when examining it as a singular comprehensive topic. Instead it is more practical to study the elements of globalization (i.e. economic liberalization, supranationalism, populism, integrated national policies etc.) in isolation then bring such topics together under a multifactor framework of analysis. This frame of analysis is similar in going from a partial to general equilibrium analysis in economics, but rather from a multidisciplinary approach. However, a complete comprehensive assessment of globalization could not be adequately portrayed in this article for sake of brevity, for that reason I will only examine the effects of trade liberalization on the politics of trade.

Like any good trade model measuring the welfare effects of trade on the factors of production (capital, labour, land) it is necessary to start with the stolper-samuelson theorem as the theoretical backbone for the welfare analysis of trade liberalization. The stolper-samuelson theorem states that the relatively abundant factor used relatively intensively in production benefits from trade liberalization, while the relatively scarce factor used relatively non-intensively in production does not benefit from trade liberalization. [iii] In other words, an increase in the relative price of labour-intensive goods will increase the wage rate and reduce the (capital) rental rate relative to both commodity prices (i.e. labour and capital-intensive goods). The stolper-samuelson theorem works because according to the ricardian trade model the price of the good that has a comparative advantage increases, while the price of the good that does not have the comparative advantage decreases, when free trade occurs between two countries.

The simple insight that the stolper-samuelson model provides, when it comes to the welfare effects of trade, goes a long way in explaining both the recent rise in resentment and prejudice against global trade liberalization. However, the stolper-samuelson theorem in reality does not act in isolation from other macroeconomic phenomena, such as global finance. Therefore, why does trade face the brunt of accusations in the backlash against globalization? To answer this question it is necessary to steer away from the topic of economics and focus on the ethics behind why individuals – in the west – can justify financial risk adverse behaviour, which has resulted in one of the largest moral hazards in history (i.e. 2008 financial crisis), while not justify the minor economic consequences of free trade. The divergence between justifying financial risk adverse behaviour versus not justifying the negative consequences of free trade is certainly an arbitrary assessment. Professor Dani Rodrik at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government found that individuals resisted free trade when it resulted in job losses as a result of unfair trade practices, as “It’s one thing to lose your job to someone who competes under the same rules as you do. It’s a different thing when you lose your job to someone who takes advantage of lax labor, environmental, tax, or safety standards in other countries.” [iv] Free trade under the same regulatory rules underpins the “fair trade” argument, however it is equally important to recognize that when barriers (i.e. countervailing duties, quotas, production subsidies) arise due to “unfair trade practices” they are often met with political buyins that distort the gains from trade. [v]

The politics of free trade shows that people suffer from a sense of “adiaphorization” of perception, when there is a disconnect between a person’s behaviour and the outcome (or effect) of their action. Adiaphorization is also referred to as the “disappearance of [individual] responsibility as a result of the division of labour.” [vi] This is most commonly illustrated in collective action failure problems. For example, the divergence between an individual’s action and the accumulated effects of his or her action(s) adding to the negative consequences of climate change (e.g. pollution). As such, people’s perception of free trade is heavily disconnected from the real economic implications of trade liberalization policies. In the 1990’s U.S. advocates for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) professed the extraordinary benefits NAFTA will have for North American productivity, competitiveness, and economic growth. However, a 2003 study illustrated that NAFTA would at most contribute to 0.5 percent of GDP growth in the United States once the agreement became fully integrated. [vii] Similarly, for Canada and Mexico the NAFTA narrative is mixed.

Despite the modest economic gains attributed to NAFTA, the public perception of free trade has hit a wall. No, this is not Trump’s physical wall with Mexico, but it is an inherently ideological, populist, idiosyncratic anti-trade barrier that has been steamrolled by demagoguery political ideals.

The recent anti-NAFTA political reaction in the United States and other western liberal democracies represents a divergence between people’s perception of FTAs, filtered through ideological lenses, and the real aggregate implications FTAs have on the overall economy. In essence, this has been the crux of trade politics as a politics of illusion. Despite the divergence between perception and effects of FTAs this does not entail that citizens’ reactions against FTAs, such as NAFTA, are inherently justified. Similar to individuals support for or against FTAs justified as being fair or unfair agreements, it is possible to justify people’s perception of FTAs (for or against free trade) depending on the political alignment of the population. This is to say even if free trade has no negative welfare impact on a person’s wellbeing, perhaps can even be beneficial, individuals will still choose to support or not support FTAs based on their own political/ideological alignment. For example, anti-free trade support based on political alignment has recently been seen across most western liberal democracies with the rise in right-wing (and left-wing) political parties. Surprisingly, the most developed countries have not been immune to trade politics as a politics of illusion.

In considering trade politics not just as the politics of utility maximization, but as a politics of illusion filtered through ideology, much of the economic models used to understand the welfare effects of trade liberalization have become obsolete. Much to the same degree how protectionism must be viewed as part of the tension of the globalization process, and not as globalization’s antithesis, a multidisciplinary approach is inherent in the study of globalization. In terms of trade politics, a multifactor approach spanning across both political science, economics, literary and cultural studies is essential. In this regard, trade politics as a politics of illusion is an exemplar of such an approach.

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i. Adrian Morrow & Nicolas Van Praet, “Boeing, Bombardier battle up in final U.S. hearing,” The Globe and Mail, December 18, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/canada-and-uk-take-on-boeing-at-us-trade-tribunal/article37367245/.
ii. Ibid.
iii. W. Stolper & P. Samuelson, “Protection and Real Wages,” The Review of Economic Studies, 9, no. 1, (1941): 58-73, http://www.jstor.org.proxy.library.carleton.ca/stable/2967638.
iv. Dani Rodrik, “Populism and the Economics of Globalization,” John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, August 2017, page. 15, https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf.
v. Ibid, 16.
vi. Harald Welzer, “Climate Wars: Why People Will Be Killed in the 21st Century,” Polity Press, page. 16.
vii. M. Angeles Villarreal & Ian F. Fergusson, “The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),” Congressional Research Service, page. 16, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf.